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causal representations they entail exert a profound influence on 
learning and reasoning (e.g., Barbey and Wolff, 2006, 2007, under 
review; Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Sloman et al., 2009; Wolff et al., 
2010). Cognitive psychologists have therefore increasingly recog-
nized the importance of investigating the psychology of explanation. 
We suggest that category learning, typicality judgments, reasoning, 
and conceptual coherence are strongly interconnected, and that our 
beliefs about the causal powers of objects, events, and agents – and 
about the rule-like causal relationships among them – are central 
to the generation and evaluation of the myriad ways in which we 
interpret, understand and explain ourselves and our environment.
Parallel developments in cognitive neuroscience have fostered 
the study of the neural mechanisms underlying explanation. For 
instance, the resurgence of cognitive simulation theories has moti-
vated neuroscience models of explanatory inference based on the 
simulation of modality-specific components of experience (e.g., 
Damasio, 1989; Barsalou, 1999; Barbey and Barsalou, 2009; Barbey 
and Grafman, in press, 2011; Barbey et al., 2011a,b). According to 
this framework, a highly integrative, multimodal representation 
system in the brain supports simulation mechanisms for explana-
tory inference across the spectrum of cognitive activities, including 
high-level perception, implicit memory, working memory, long-
term memory, and conceptual knowledge (for a recent review, see 
Barbey and Barsalou, 2009). Although the functional topography 
Prefrontal contributions to exPlanatory inference
The human mind is driven toward understanding. We wonder why 
events unfold in particular ways, why objects have specific properties 
and why people behave the way they do. The capacity to infer the 
causal structure of experience and to generate explanations is central 
to our sense of understanding, making possible the formation of 
conceptual representations that constrain inference, guide generali-
zation, and provide the basis for goal-directed, intelligent behavior. 
Accordingly, extensive research in social psychology and philosophy 
is dedicated to the study of explanation, with social psychology 
focusing on explanations of behavior (e.g., Heider, 1958; Gilbert, 
1998; Malle, 2004) and philosophy on explanation in science (e.g., 
Salmon, 1998; Kitcher and Salmon, 1989). Only recently, however, 
has cognitive science addressed such questions as what constitutes 
an explanation, what makes some explanations better than others, 
and the principles that determine when we seek explanations and 
how we generate them (e.g., Keil and Wilson, 2000; Keil, 2006).
Two recent developments have spurred the emergence and 
growth of research on explanation within cognitive psychology. 
First, prominent theories of conceptual knowledge accord a central 
role to explanation (e.g., Carey, 1985; Murphy and Medin, 1985; 
Murphy, 2002; Keil, 2003, 2006). Explanations facilitate category 
learning, influence judgments of the typicality of category mem-
bers and foster conceptual coherence. Second, explanations and the 
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cesses have become increasingly well understood, remarkably little 
is known about the simulation mechanisms that encode the higher-
level structure of experience, representing causal relationships that 
support explanatory inference and establish the proper mappings 
between situations, actions and consequences necessary for coor-
dinated, purposeful behavior. The absence of such data represents 
a substantial gap in understanding both the neural architecture of 
cognitive simulations and their role in higher cognitive functions.
Here we introduce an integrative cognitive neuroscience theory 
for understanding the mechanisms that enable the top-down con-
trol and coordination of modality-specific representations, drawing 
upon recent theoretical developments in cognitive psychology and 
emerging neuroscience evidence indicating that the lateral prefron-
tal cortex (PFC) supports the generation, evaluation, and coor-
dination of representations that encode the causal structure and 
probable causal implications of events, and thus provide the basis 
for causal understanding of our environment and for our day-to-
day navigation through that environment. We regard explanation 
featuring a specific causal mechanism as the central or prototypi-
cal case of causal explanation. Less central are cases in which one 
must act without having settled confidently on one mechanism or 
another, or again, while simply assuming that there is some causal 
mechanism at work but without having any good idea what it might 
be. At the ragged edge of understanding we sometimes have to be 
content with statistical correlations. Here we note another signifi-
cant gap in current understanding of causal explanations: statistical 
correlations do in many circumstances give rise to the formulation 
of causal generalizations (including causal mechanisms) that we 
then apply to new cases in relevantly similar circumstances. And 
although we will review evidence that different brain systems sup-
port inductive reasoning to probabilistic generalizations on the 
one hand, and deductive causal reasoning (from a “major premise” 
asserting a general causal relationship and another premise bring-
ing some particular event under that causal rule) on the other, the 
circumstances under which, and the processes by which, we move 
from statistical correlation to causality remain to be investigated.
We begin by reviewing psychological research on the structure 
of explanations, surveying contemporary research and theory from 
cognitive psychology suggesting that explanatory inference accom-
modates novel information in the context of background beliefs, 
as it enables generalizations and predictions about self, others, and 
the environment. We then review the biology, evolution and ontog-
eny of the human PFC, and introduce a cognitive neuroscience 
framework for causal inference based on a functional division of 
labor within the lateral PFC. Our review examines a broad range 
of evidence from the social and decision neuroscience literatures 
demonstrating that computational mechanisms for the generation 
and evaluation of causal simulations are mediated by functionally 
specialized regions of the lateral PFC (ventrolateral PFC and dorso-
lateral PFC, respectively), and that at yet higher levels of complexity, 
where these and other cognitive processes must be coordinated, 
causal inference is further supported by the anterolateral PFC. We 
show how this framework supports the integration of a diverse 
body of neuroscience evidence concerning human reasoning not 
just about basic physical and social contexts, but also within the 
context of moral, ethical, and legal systems of value and belief.
Psychology of exPlanation
Psychological evidence supports the predominance of causation 
in explanation (e.g., Barbey and Wolff, 2006, 2007, under review; 
Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Sloman et al., 2009; Wolff et al., 2010). 
Explanations typically appeal to causes, along with knowledge of 
general patterns that constrain which causes are judged to be prob-
able (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986) and relevant (Lombrozo and 
Carey, 2006; Wellman and Liu, 2007). Explanations recruit a great 
deal of prior knowledge, establishing relevant causal mechanisms 
that provide a source of constraint for reasoning and a basis for 
generalizing from known to novel cases (reviewed in Lombrozo, 
2006). As a consequence, the top-down control and coordination 
of behavior depends on the capacity to generate causal explanations 
and understanding of the physical and social world.
causal rePresentations
A major function of the PFC is to extract statistical regularities 
across experience in an effort to infer general patterns and causal 
relationships that establish the proper mappings between situa-
tions, actions and consequences necessary for goal-directed behav-
ior (for reviews, see Miller, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; see also 
Barbey et al., in press). By extracting the higher-level structure of 
experience, representations within the PFC enable the top-down 
control and coordination of multiple brain mechanisms across 
diverse brain areas and networks (for a recent review of the neu-
robiological mechanisms underlying PFC function, see Miller and 
Phelps, 2010).
causal rePresentations in the lateral Pfc
Behaviorally relevant causal information about causal pow-
ers and causal associations and patterns, and the causal infer-
ences these support, are encoded by diverse areas of lateral PFC 
(Figure 1; for reviews, see Miller, 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001). 
We will not discuss here the issue of whether our representations 
of events, or of agents and objects and their causal powers, are 
through-and-through a matter of modal simulations (as when 
we see or imagine billiard balls colliding, levees breaking, etc.), 
or whether more schematic and abstract – and perhaps even 
amodal – representations are involved. Elsewhere we suggest and 
defend a pluralistic approach within which modal simulation 
is the evolutionarily oldest – and probably still the default – 
medium of causal reasoning, but on which one employs more 
or less schematic, and more or less abstract modes of reason-
ing depending on one’s circumstances (Patterson and Barbey, in 
press). As will become evident, the framework we propose here 
will accommodate a wide variety of views about the ground-level 
nature of causal representations.
While the lateral PFC is a site of convergence for the synthesis of 
multimodal information from a wide range of brain systems (see 
below on connectivity of these regions), we propose that the neural 
architecture of the lateral PFC entails two pathways for explana-
tory inference. The ventrolateral PFC supports the generation and 
maintenance of causal simulations, relying upon computational 
mechanisms for detecting and encoding causal relationships. 
Within this framework, as a causal event is experienced repeat-
edly, its simulated components and the causal relationships linking 
them increase in potency. Thus when one component is perceived 
Barbey and Patterson  Architecture of explanatory inference
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition    July 2011  | Volume 2  |  Article 162  |  2Ventrolateral areas are more heavily interconnected with cortical 
regions for processing information about visual form and stimulus 
identity (inferior temporal cortex) that supports the detection of 
causal relationships and the categorization of environmental stim-
uli. Dorsal portions of the lateral PFC are heavily interconnected 
with cortical areas for processing visuospatial and motor as well 
as auditory information. It is primarily the capacity to manipu-
late visuospatially arrayed representations of objects and events in 
causal scenarios that makes possible the evaluation and adjustment 
of causal understanding to serve one’s short and long-term needs 
(Barbey et al., 2009a). Finally, the anterolateral PFC is indirectly 
connected (via the ventromedial PFC) with limbic structures that 
process internal information, such as emotion, memory, and reward 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Pandya and Barnes, 1987; Fuster, 1989; 
Barbas and Pandya, 1991). The lateral PFC therefore enables the 
synthesis of information across this broadly distributed network of 
modal brain regions (for pertinent reviews, see Kringelbach, 2005).
Research investigating the evolution and ontogeny of the PFC 
suggests that the lateral PFC initially emerged from ventrolateral 
prefrontal regions, followed by dorsolateral and then anterolateral 
cortices (Figure 3; Flechsig, 1901, 1920; Fuster, 1997).
From an evolutionary perspective, the emergence of lateral PFC 
subregions reflects their relative priority for goal-directed behavior, 
with the ventrolateral PFC enabling the capacity to maintain basic 
causal beliefs and generate explanatory inferences. The fine details 
of the human capacity to represent a range of possible causal out-
comes or antecedents of a given situation are not yet understood, 
but we suggest that these go hand-in-hand with the capacity to 
evaluate causal explanations and to plan, monitor, and adjust causal 
behavior in light of our causal understandings – abilities supported 
by the dorsolateral PFC.
initially, these strong associations complete the pattern automati-
cally, supporting inferences about the underlying cause(s) and their 
resulting effect(s).
On the basis of this same experience one also forms represen-
tations of the causal powers, active and receptive, of the agents, 
objects, and events involved in causal situations. These represen-
tations underlie the implicit and explicit production of novel and 
counterfactual simulations critical for planning, monitoring, and 
adjusting behavior.
These first level explanations and inferences must often be evalu-
ated and re-evaluated as we make our way in the world – e.g., by 
devising, imagining, or performing an intervention to find out 
whether or not an effect is present in the absence of the candidate 
cause. Such evaluations are supported by computational mecha-
nisms in the dorsolateral PFC. This framework of causal evalua-
tion operating over representations of causal patterns and powers 
is supported in the first instance by classic neuroscience research 
on working memory, which demonstrates that the ventrolateral 
PFC supports the maintenance of cognitive representations and 
the dorsolateral PFC is additionally recruited for monitoring and 
manipulating items (e.g., Petrides, 2005; D’Esposito et al., 1999). 
Further, and more direct, evidence is reviewed below.
anatomical connectivity, evolution, and 
develoPment of the lateral Pfc
The inferential architecture of the lateral PFC derives from the 
anatomical connectivity, evolution, and development of this region. 
The lateral PFC consists of three major subregions that emphasize 
processing of particular information based on their interconnec-
tions with specific cortical regions (Figure 2).
Figure 1 | Brodmann map of the lateral PFC. Reproduced with permission 
from Ramnani and Owen (2004).
Figure 2 | integrative anatomy of the macaque monkey PFC. Numbers 
refer to subregions within the lateral PFC defined by Brodmann. Modified with 
permission from Miller (2000).
Barbey and Patterson  Architecture of explanatory inference
www.frontiersin.org  July 2011  | Volume 2  |  Article 162  |  3physical, biological, emotional, social, and other information will 
be used in performing the functions we associate with all three 
areas of PFC focused on here. The suggestion is rather that these 
functions and their anatomical correlates are integrated, and that 
there is substantial evidence that one useful way of distinguish-
ing functions of the PFC with regard to causal explanation and 
inference in particular coincides with the anatomical division into 
ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and anterolateral PFC.
An empirical case for the functional specificity of ventrolateral 
PFC for the maintenance of information and dorsolateral PFC in 
the manipulation of representations has been established in the 
functional neuroimaging literature on working memory, providing 
evidence that broadly supports the proposed functional organi-
zation of lateral PFC (for meta-analytic reviews, see Wager and 
Smith, 2003; Wager et al., 2004; Owen et al., 2005). It makes good 
sense that dorsolateral PFC is, on the one hand, heavily involved 
in the evaluation of causal explanations and, on the other hand, is 
strongly interconnected with visuospatial processing areas, because 
such evaluation is typically carried out via manipulation of visu-
ospatial arrays of representations of potential causes, background 
conditions, enablers, etc. This holds for theories emphasizing the 
use of modal simulations as well as for those centering on much 
more schematic, abstract, and even amodal representations (see 
Barbey and Wolff, 2006, 2007; Patterson and Barbey, in press, under 
revision; Sloman et al., 2009). Meanwhile anterolateral PFC has 
been shown in a range of research reviewed above to be involved 
on the one hand in higher-order reasoning and, on the other, in 
social cognition. This correlation, too, makes good sense in that 
human social understanding and decision making are frequently 
complex, drawing on and integrating multiple cues of diverse types 
Finally, the evolution of the anterolateral PFC enabled  processing 
of higher-order relations and reasoning about complex forms of 
goal-directed behavior involving both the generation and evalua-
tion of explanatory inferences (for a review, see Ramnani and Owen, 
2004), but also the integration of these processes with hedonic and 
emotional information associated with different causal scenarios, 
and especially with different possible causal outcomes. Consistent 
with its evolutionary development, the ontogeny of the lateral PFC 
reflects the importance of first establishing explanations for under-
standing the physical and social world, followed by the capacity 
to manipulate and evaluate these explanations, and finally high-
order inferences involving both sorts of activity – along with the 
coordination of these processes with further relevant information 
and computation including the assessment of hedonic outcomes 
of possible actions. This coordination of multiple processes will 
routinely characterize human inferences about the multifaceted 
(causal) outcomes of actions, and is in general supported by the 
anterolateral PFC (Ramnani and Owen, 2004). We focus here on 
the anterolateral PFC, but with some reference to its connections 
with the larger anterior PFC and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
among other regions. Hedonic valences of rewards and punishers 
along with their connections to specific stimuli are represented 
largely in OFC, and this information will typically be incorpo-
rated into human calculations of outcomes and decision making 
(Kringelbach, 2005). For a recent review of pertinent developmental 
evidence, see Rochat (2009).
This is not to suggest that any of such functions (e.g., stimulus 
identification via spatial properties, spatial mapping of the environ-
ment, control of behavior, engagement in social transactions, etc.) 
are carried out solely by any one region of PFC. On the contrary, 
Figure 3 | Ontogenetic map of the prefrontal cortex according to Flechsig (1901, 1920). The numeration of the areas indicates the order of their myelination. 
Modified with permission from Flechsig (1920).
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We now turn to a review of recent evidence from the social and deci-
sion neuroscience literatures demonstrating (1) the involvement 
of the ventrolateral PFC for the generation and maintenance of 
explanatory inferences, (2) the recruitment of the dorsolateral PFC 
for evaluating possible explanations in light of normative criteria, 
and (3) activation in the anterolateral PFC for manipulation and 
utilization of higher-order inferences that incorporate both types 
of process and also coordinate these with other relevant processes, 
such as computation of hedonic values of predicted outcomes of 
potential actions (Figure 4). The representational architecture 
underlying these forms of inference further predicts the recruit-
ment of broadly distributed neural systems, incorporating medial 
prefrontal (Barbey et al., 2011a; for reviews, see Kringelbach, 2005; 
Amodio and Frith, 2006) and posterior knowledge networks (e.g., 
Simmons et al., 2010) representing unimodal and multimodal 
components of experience.
ventrolateral Pfc
Social neuroscience studies have shown that explanatory infer-
ence is mediated by the ventrolateral PFC (areas 44, 45, and 47; 
Figure 4B). Fiddick et al. (2005), observed recruitment of ventro-
lateral PFC when participants drew explanatory social inferences 
based on normative beliefs concerning reciprocal altruism and 
social exchange. Speaking more generally, this region is recruited 
when representing normative rules that guide social behavior 
(Barbey et al., 2009a). It is particularly sensitive to norm viola-
tions that motivate explanatory inferences about the cause(s) of 
deviant (i.e., non-normative) behavior (for recent behavioral evi-
dence, see Uttich and Lombrozo, 2010). Berthoz et al. (2002), for 
into coherent explanatory scenarios. “Immediate” situations are 
in turn imbedded in larger causal scenarios and narratives that 
one must take into account, where these sometimes reach as far as 
overarching life goals, and where one wants to consider at many 
points the likely hedonic and emotional impact of possible actions. 
And of course, such representations are subject to both top-down 
and bottom-up influences, as we consider “what difference it might 
make” for our pursuit of some larger goal if we undertake one 
immediate action rather than another, or for what we should do 
here and now if we are to further one long-term goal rather than 
another. This further suggests that for the anterolateral PFC to fulfill 
its role not just with regard to higher-order inference in general, 
but social and emotional life in particular, its strong connectivity 
to OFC and, via ventromedial PFC, with the limbic system is criti-
cal, since our inferences about what will result from a given action, 
and for whom, and how, will have to include much information 
about, and computations of, hedonic and emotional values. But 
the evolutionary history of the connectivity of the anterolateral 
PFC with OFC and subcortical limbic areas remains to be written.
We note finally that the picture given just above dovetails with 
additional evidence that the anterior-to-posterior axis of the lat-
eral PFC is organized hierarchically, whereby progressively anterior 
subregions are associated with higher-order processing require-
ments for planning and the selection of action (for recent reviews, 
see Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; 
Badre, 2008; Botvinick, 2008). Thus, processes within the lateral 
PFC respect the hierarchical organization of this region, with pro-
gressively anterior regions representing causal simulations that sup-
port higher-order inferences based on computational mechanisms 
for generating and evaluating explanations.
Figure 4 | Neural architecture of explanatory inference. (A) Summarizes the functional organization of the lateral PFC, and (B–D) illustrate supportive evidence.
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the linguistic content, linguistic complexity, and deductive com-
plexity of reasoning problems), simple deductions in general are 
supported by ventrolateral PFC. A recent series of experiments by 
Monti et al. (2007) controlled for these sources of variability and 
provided evidence that the left ventrolateral PFC (area 47) mediates 
representations of the logical structure of a deductive argument 
(e.g., If P or Q, then Not-R/P/Therefore, Not-R), supporting the gen-
eration of explanatory inferences within this region. Furthermore, 
a recent study by Kroger et al. (2008) controlled for the complexity 
and type of calculations that were performed and also observed 
activation within the left ventrolateral PFC (areas 44 and 45) for 
deductive reasoning (see also Heckers et al., 2004). Converging 
evidence is provided by Goel and colleagues (Goel et al., 2000; 
Goel and Dolan, 2004), who have consistently observed activation 
within the left ventrolateral PFC (areas 44 and 45) for deductive 
conclusions drawn from categorical syllogisms (e.g., All humans 
are mortal/Some animals are human/Therefore, some animals are 
mortal). Finally, Noveck et al. (2004) demonstrated recruitment of 
left ventrolateral PFC (area 47) for drawing deductive conclusions 
from conditional statements (e.g., If P then Q/P/Therefore, Q), 
consistent with the role of this region for generating explanatory 
inferences. In sum, this evidence indicates that generating a broad 
array of physical, social, and other explanations are supported by 
the ventrolateral PFC.
dorsolateral Pfc
Social neuroscience evidence demonstrates that the dorsolateral 
PFC (areas 46 and 9) represents computational mechanisms for 
evaluating explanations and causal scenarios based on some nor-
mative criterion, where that may involve testing an attribution of 
correctness to a causal scenario (as in thinking about pertinent 
causal interventions), or about an attribution of fairness or permis-
sibility – or the opposite – concerning causal outcomes of alterna-
tive possible actions (Figure 4C). An early study by Sanfey et al. 
(2003) reported activity within the right dorsolateral PFC (area 
46) when participants were presented with an unfair offer. Knoch 
et al. (2006) further demonstrated that deactivating this region with 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation reduced participants’ 
ability to reject unfair offers in an ultimatum game. In these cases 
the making of an offer is in itself in accordance with the norms 
or rules of the game, but a norm of fairness has been violated – 
perhaps egregiously, as when one is offered only 1 dollar out of 
the 10 to be divided. One’s response goes beyond detection of the 
unfairness, since one must then decide what to do about accepting 
or rejecting the offer, and this will typically involve weighing the 
outcomes of these options in light of multiple goals – the goal of 
maximizing one’s money in the game, or the social goal of asserting 
and maintaining one’s status (Rilling et al., 2008), or the goal of 
defending a commitment to fairness and to punishing unfairness, 
and perhaps other “higher” or coordinate goals.
Buckholtz et al. (2008) observed activity within the right dor-
solateral PFC (area 46) when participants evaluated the causal 
role of specific factors, assigning responsibility for crimes and 
making judgments about appropriate (e.g., equitable or fair) 
forms of punishment in a legal decision making task. The work 
of Greene et al. (2004) further suggests that this region is involved 
example, demonstrated recruitment of left ventrolateral PFC (area 
47) when participants detected violations of social norms stories 
representing obligatory and prohibited courses of action (e.g., the 
decision to “spit out food made by the host”). Similarly, Rilling et al. 
(2008) reported activation within left ventrolateral PFC (area 47) 
when participants detected the failure to cooperate in a Prisoner’s 
dilemma game. Here the need for explanation is especially pressing, 
for we want to understand why the usual explanation or cause (as 
set forth in a social norm or rule) does not hold in a particular case. 
Does some “higher” or super-ordinate rule – or simply a conflicting 
coordinate rule – come into play in this particular situation? Or 
is there some other explanation altogether? In the food-spitting 
example, the explanation is presumably not a matter of a conflict 
among social rules, but a visceral response (perhaps to food that 
a particular person finds intensely nauseating). The research here 
does not establish whether ventrolateral PFC can “handle” the test-
ing and comparison of alternative explanations (as opposed to the 
detection of a violation of some salient and usually explanatorily 
adequate social rule or norm). This needs to be investigated further, 
as part of making as clear as possible the conditions under which 
dorsolateral PFC, or even anterolateral PFC, must be recruited.
Meanwhile the decision neuroscience literature supports the 
proposed tripartite framework by suggesting a reason why, from 
a wider perspective, the ventrolateral PFC should be involved in 
the generation of basic social (and other) sorts of causal explana-
tion. One very common type of explanation in everyday life and 
in scientific contexts depends essentially on deductive inference, as 
when some “covering law,” or a behavioral rule or norm, combines 
with a statement of some particular facts to entail that some other 
fact must obtain, or that some specific action is obligatory, etc. For 
example, if books burn at Fahrenheit 451, and this book is heated 
to Fahrenheit 500, it will burn – that is, given an implicit ceterus 
paribus clause (“other things being equal”), or given the appropriate 
“enabling” or “background” conditions, such as that the book is not 
sopping wet, etc. Similarly, a great many everyday explanations in 
social and psychological, as well as physical, domains will explicitly 
or implicitly take the form of very simple deductions. For example, 
Why does one not spit out this bite of food, even if it tastes bad? 
Because one must not offend one’s host. Phrased as a very sim-
ple deduction, we have: one must not do something that offends 
the host; spitting out the host’s home-cooked food would offend 
the host; therefore one must not spit out the host’s home-cooked 
food. This gives a general explanation for a more specific, but still 
general, rule. To get a prohibition against this person’s spitting out 
this host’s food on this occasion, we simply note that this person 
is a guest of that person, and that this food was home-cooked by 
the latter. This casts the explanation of why one doesn’t spit out 
the host’s food as a natural and simple deduction appealing to a 
general premise about what is impermissible. The explanation of 
why someone on a particular occasion did spit out the host’s food 
would appeal to a different premise and deduction. (Perhaps, One 
involuntarily spits out food that is rotten and intensely nauseating; 
this person finds this food intensely nauseating.) Many everyday 
deductions are so intuitively obvious that they can be carried out 
automatically, but others will require conscious attention. The 
important point here is that a substantial body of neuroscientific 
research, if not a complete consensus in the field, strongly indicates 
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emotional expression and personal identity), further suggesting 
that this region broadly supports the generation and evaluation of 
explanatory social inferences (for additional neuroscience evidence, 
see Moll et al., 2006).
It is, however, not merely the social nature of such inference 
that calls for involvement of anterior PFC, for as noted earlier, 
some social inferences (involving both adherence to and violations 
of social norms) are primarily supported by ventrolateral or dor-
solateral PFC. What marks the involvement of anterior PFC, and 
explains the strong connection to social reasoning, is that typical 
“real life” social inference involves coordination and integration of 
multiple cognitive or computational tasks in the service of a larger 
goal. In particular, social reasoning that guides actual interactions 
with others will routinely integrate emotional and hedonic consid-
erations into the evaluation of potential explanations of past actions 
and into deliberation about potential courses of future action. Thus 
anterior PFC draws on the resources of limbic areas (with which 
it is strongly connected via ventromedial PFC) and on hedonic 
representations in OFC (with which it is strongly interconnected; 
Kringelbach, 2005), as well as on the explanatory scenarios and the 
evaluative reflections and manipulations supported by ventrolateral 
and dorsolateral PFC.
conclusion
inferential architecture of lateral Pfc
We have reviewed converging lines of evidence to support the cen-
tral role of the lateral PFC in explanatory inference, drawing upon 
recent theoretical developments in cognitive psychology and neuro-
science bearing on the biology, evolution, ontogeny, and cognitive 
functions of this region. We have surveyed a broad range of evidence 
from social and decision neuroscience demonstrating that the lat-
eral PFC mediates the generation and evaluation of explanations, 
with the ventrolateral PFC recruited when constructing explanatory 
inferences, engagement of the dorsolateral PFC for the evaluation 
of explanations, and the anterolateral PFC recruited when we uti-
lize both of these processes – and additional ones with which they 
must be coordinated (such as the calculation of hedonic values of 
possible outcomes or actions; Figure 4A). The reviewed findings set 
the stage for new approaches to understanding the architecture of 
cognitive understanding suggesting that neural mechanisms within 
the lateral PFC detect and encode the higher-level structure of 
experience, representing causal relationships that guide the selec-
tion and control of modality-specific knowledge and provide the 
basis for explanatory inference.
Our findings raise further questions for future neuroscience 
research. One challenge is to address how neural mechanisms 
for generating and evaluating explanatory inferences are rep-
resented within dual process theories that distinguish between 
automatic versus controlled cognitive processes (e.g., Barbey and 
Sloman, 2007). Future research should further investigate the 
cognitive operations that are performed within the lateral PFC 
to support human inference. Does this region contain mecha-
nisms that control the recruitment of representations stored in 
posterior cortices (e.g., Barbey et al., 2009a,b, 2011a,b, in press; 
Barbey and Grafman, in press, 2011), serve as an integrative 
hub for synthesizing modality-specific representations (e.g., 
in   normative evaluations involving conflicting moral goals. These 
authors employed moral scenarios similar to the trolley problem 
(Thomson, 1976) and assessed trials in which participants acted in 
the interest of greater aggregate welfare at the expense of personal 
moral standards. This contrast revealed reliable activation within 
the right dorsolateral PFC (area 46), suggesting that this region 
is critical for normative evaluations involving conflicting moral 
goals. (For additional evidence for the role of this region in such 
evaluative processes, see Prehn et al., 2008; Weissman et al., 2008).
We suggest that the relevant common factor in all these various 
cases is a “second order” reflection upon an initial or “first order” 
causal scenario (whose formulation was supported by ventrolateral 
PFC), where reflection on that scenario is motivated by some need 
to “think again” or “think twice,” in order to decide whether to 
attribute or withhold attribution of some normative property – e.g., 
moral permissibility, fairness, social utility – to some given causal 
scenario(s). We suggest that the main reason studies with widely 
differing orientations have found involvement of dorsolateral PFC 
is that the kinds of norms involved show a corresponding variety.
anterior Pfc
Additional support for the general framework proposed here 
derives from the decision neuroscience literature, which demon-
strates that progressively anterior subregions of the lateral PFC 
(area 10) are associated with higher-order processing requirements 
for thought and action (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Badre, 
2008; Botvinick, 2008). Ramnani and Owen (2004) reviewed con-
temporary research and theory investigating the cognitive functions 
of the anterior PFC, concluding that this region is central for inte-
grating the outcomes of multiple cognitive operations, consistent 
with the predicted role of the anterior PFC for representing higher-
order inferences that depend on the generation and evaluation of 
explanatory inferences (for representative findings, see Christoff 
et al., 2001, 2003; Christoff and Keramatian, 2007; Smith et al., 
2007; Kroger et al., 2008; Barbey et al., 2011a).
This is to frame the issue once again in terms of levels of pro-
cessing, with complexity increasing with anteriority. A large body 
of social neuroscience evidence supports this picture, although it 
may at first glance appear in some cases to invoke anterior PFC 
on the basic of content or subject matter (social and emotional) 
rather than level of complexity. It is well-established that anterior 
PFC (areas 10 and 11) – and the OFC more broadly – are central 
for explanatory social inference (Figure 4D). Studies of patients 
with lesions confined to the OFC have reported impairments in a 
wide range of social functions, including the regulation and con-
trol of social responses, the perception and integration of social 
cues, theory of mind and perspective taking (Rolls et al., 1994; 
Bechara et al., 2000; Ruby and Decety, 2004; LoPresti et al., 2008). 
Recent evidence from Stone et al. (2002) further demonstrates that 
patients with OFC damage show selective impairments in reasoning 
about normative social behavior and drawing explanatory social 
inferences. Bechara et al. (2000) observed profound deficits in the 
ability of OFC patients to represent and integrate social and emo-
tional knowledge needed to generate mental state ascriptions and 
explanatory inferences about the causes of observed social behavior. 
Converging evidence is provided by LoPresti et al. (2008), who 
demonstrated that the left anterolateral PFC (area 11)   mediates 
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